# source excerpt from https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206\_2bvr054721en.html

IRI: <https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a136e3-96c5-74f2-b7ff-64db1533bc8a>

Within: [Judgment of the Second Senate of 6 December 2022](https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a136e1-ff3c-74e7-a92f-e89ab4aa9f33)

Type: [oa:SpecificResource](http://www.w3.org/ns/oa#SpecificResource)

- `adms:identifier`: [retained-legal-source-passage f8edd1359120cf1e5fdf6fc814275161fe918b232e0a568f9dbbe6816879ea77](https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a136e3-96ca-74e0-ac1f-f6abce649bb3)
- `oa:bodyValue`: {"legal\_state":"unknown","passage":{"end\_byte":103776,"instrument\_iri":"https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a136e1-ff3c-74e7-a92f-e89ab4aa9f33","original\_sha256":"ee29139d7643a45f3481b73f67e72b88319aaaa0a3f0e70309c72499cb21e351","parsed\_text\_sha256":"5a5bc5dcb4029525539a6e857867318a14192d06e8b3f1f8b9efdd27ceedf033","source\_url":"https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206\_2bvr054721en.html","start\_byte":92110},"policy":"retained-legal-source-passage-v1","quote":" Nor can it be argued that the complainants in proceedings no. I lack standing on the grounds that the 2020 EU Own Resources Decision does not directly affect their legal interests. In the context of an ultra vires act, any manifest and structurally significant violation of the principle of conferral by EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies intrudes upon the principle of the sovereignty of the people and, therefore, also infringes on the right of citizens under Art. 38(1) first sentence in conjunction with Art. 20(2) first sentence and Art. 79(3) GG. These constitutional guarantees confer upon citizens the right not to be subjected to a political authority that they cannot escape and as to which they cannot in principle influence, on free and equal terms, the persons in power or the decision-making on substantive issues (cf. BVerfGE 142, 123 <191 para. 128, 209 para. 166>; 151, 202 <285 f. para. 117> – European Banking Union ; 154, 17 <85 para. 99> – PSPP asset purchase programme of the ECB ). Democratic legitimation is only conferred within the limits of the European integration agenda to the extent that the approval given by the Bundestag and the Bundestag in accordance with Art. 23(1) GG. It can thus also not be argued that the German legislator has issued a more specific order giving effect to European law at the domestic level on the basis of § 3(1) IntVG by adopting an act of approval as to a particular EU measure, which could then take precedence over the act of approval ratifying the underlying treaty. This argument is without merit, as it disregards the supremacy of the Constitution, which takes precedence over statutory law at the domestic level. \\n\\n115 \\n\\n Based on these considerations, the complainants in proceedings no. I have standing. To establish standing, it does not matter whether the constitutional challenge concerns a law authorising the German representative to consent to an EU measure in the Council – as was the case with the SSM Authorising Act – or whether the legislator itself directly adopts an act of approval – as is the case here with the Act Ratifying the EU Own Resources Decision. In the latter situation, granting admissibility to a constitutional complaint that asserts a violation of the fundamental right to democratic self-determination derived from Art. 38(1) first sentence in conjunction with Art. 20(1) and (2) and Art. 79(3) GG does not result in an excessive expansion of this right. On the contrary, admitting such challenges is necessary to safeguard the right to democratic self-determination, which would otherwise be rendered meaningless. \\n\\n116 \\n\\n(2) Lastly, an ultra vires challenge can also be based on the assertion that an EU measure violates the no-bailout clause under Art. 125(1) TFEU. The fact that the Second Senate has dismissed as inadmissible a different constitutional complaint that had been directed against the Act on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM Act), claiming a violation of Art. 125 TFEU, does not warrant a different conclusion. In the ESM case, the Second Senate held that Art. 125 TFEU does not preclude the German legislator from amending the framework on the monetary union in accordance with the relevant treaty-amending procedures (cf. BVerfGE 132, 287 <292 para. 10). Yet the issue raised in the present proceedings is a different one, namely, that the no-bailout clause in Art. 125 TFEU prohibits certain measures, such as those imposing liability either on the European Union itself or on the Members States for commitments assumed by others. In this respect, Art. 125 TFEU goes beyond setting legal requirements for the design of the EU’s financial system. Art. 125 TFEU can also be read as explicitly barring the European Union from taking certain measures in view of the objective of the no-bailout clause, which is to ensure that Member States remain subject to the logic of the market when they enter into debt in order to maintain the stability of the monetary union (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 27 November 2012, Pringle , C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756; \[…\]). By asserting a violation of this standard, the constitutional complaint raises a permissible ultra vires challenge. \\n\\nII.\\n\\n\\n117 \\n\\n As regards the constitutional complaint lodged in proceedings no. II, the foregoing considerations on the issues of admissibility and standing apply accordingly. \\n\\n118 \\n\\n In addition, the constitutional complaint is sufficiently substantiated insofar as the complainant asserts that Arts. 4 and 5 of the 2020 EU Own Resources Decision impair the overall budgetary responsibility vested in the Bundestag . Invoking the constitutional standards developed in the Second Senate’s case-law, the complainant contends that with its approval to the 2020 EU Own Resources Decision, the Bundestag essentially signs away vital decision-making, policy-shaping and oversight powers of significant scope; according to the complainant, this runs counter to the principle that Germany may not assume liability for decisions taken by others on which German public authority has no influence. \[...\] \\n\\n119 \\n\\n \[…\] \\n\\nC.\\n\\n\\n120 \\n\\n The constitutional complaints are, however, unfounded. Measured against the standards developed by the Second Senate for constitutional review on the basis of the ultra vires doctrine (ultra vires review) and the review on the basis of constitutional identity (identity review) (see I. below), the 2020 EU Own Resources Decision does not violate the complainants’ rights under Art. 38(1) in conjunction with Art. 20(1) and (2) and Art. 79(3) GG. In the understanding affirmed by the European Commission and the Federal Government, the 2020 EU Resources Decision – supposing that it has structural significance for the division of competences between the EU and the Member States – does not amount to a manifest exceeding of the powers conferred by the Treaties in Art. 311(2) and (3) in conjunction with Art. 122(1) and (2) TFEU (see II.1 below), nor does it intrude upon the overall budgetary responsibility of the Bundestag (see II.2 below). There is no need for the Federal Constitutional Court to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) pursuant to Art. 267 TFEU (see III. below). \\n\\nI.\\n\\n\\n121 \\n\\n 1. The right to democratic self-determination, which follows from Art. 38(1) first sentence in conjunction with Art. 20(1) and (2) and Art. 79(3) GG, not only protects citizens against a substantial erosion of the Bundestag ’s latitude to shape policy, but also affords them the right to demand that EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies exercise only those competences transferred to them in accordance with Art. 23 GG (cf. BVerfGE 142, 123 <173 para. 80 ff.>; 146, 216 <251 para. 50>; 151, 202 <275 para. 92> – European Banking Union ; 157, 332 <380 para. 82> – Act Ratifying the EU Own Resources Decision – preliminary injunction ). This right is violated when institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the EU take measures that are outside the scope of the European integration agenda (cf. BVerfGE 75, 223 <235, 242>; 89, 155 <188>; 123, 267 <353>; 126, 286 <302 ff.>; 134, 366 <382 ff. para. 23 ff.>; 142, 123 <203 para. 153>; 146, 216 <252 f. para. 52 f.>; 151, 202 <275 para. 92> – European Banking Union ; 157, 332 <380 para. 82> – Act Ratifying the EU Own Resources Decision – preliminary injunction ) and when the execution of the integration agenda exceeds the limits set out in Art. 79(3) GG (cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 <353>; 126, 286 <302>; 133, 277 <316>; 134, 366 <382 para. 22, 384 ff. para. 27 ff.>; 140, 317 <336 ff. para. 40 ff.>; 142, 123 <203 para. 153>; 146, 216 <253 para. 54>; 151, 202 <275 para. 92> – European Banking Union ; 157, 332 <380 para. 82> – Act Ratifying the EU Own Resources Decision – preliminary injunction ). \\n\\n122 \\n\\n When constitutional organs participate in the execution and in the further shaping and development of the integration agenda, the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution obliges them to ensure that the limits of this agenda are respected as well (cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 <351 ff.., 435>; 129, 124 <180 f.>; 135, 317 <399 ff. para. 159 ff.>; 142, 123 <208 para. 164>; 151, 202 <296 f. para. 141> – European Banking Union ). In this regard, constitutional organs have a lasting responsibility to ensure that institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies of the European Union adhere to the European integration agenda (cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 <352 ff., 389 ff., 413 ff.>; 126, 286 <307>; 129, 124 <181>; 132, 195 <238 f. para. 105>; 134, 366 <394 f. para. 47>; 142, 123 <208 para. 165>; 151, 202 <296 f. para. 141> – European Banking Union ). Similar to the state’s duties to protect arising from fundamental rights, the responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung ) requires constitutional organs to protect and promote the legal interests of individual rights holders under Art. 38(1) first sentence in conjunction with Art. 20(2) first sentence GG when the latter are not themselves able to ensure that their rights are upheld (cf. BVerfGE 142, 123 <209 para. 166>; 151, 202 <297 para. 142> – European Banking Union ). This responsibility corresponds to a right afforded citizens vis-à-vis the constitutional organs, enshrined in Art. 38(1) first sentence GG, which compels the latter to ensure that any restriction of the right of citizens to democratic self-determination resulting from the implementation of the European integration agenda does not go beyond what is justified by the permissible transfer of sovereign powers to the European Union (cf. BVerfGE 151, 202 <297 para. 142> – European Banking Union ). \\n\\n123 \\n\\n Art. 23(2) and (3) GG therefore entail not only a right (cf. BVerfGE 131, 152 <196 ff.>; 132, 195 <260 para. 156, 271 f. para. 181 f.>; 135, 317 <402 f. para. 166, 420 para. 213, 428 para. 232 f.>; 157, 1 <23 para. 70> – CETA – Organstreit I ), but also a duty (cf. BVerfGE 134, 366 <395 para. 49>; 146, 216 <250 para. 49>; \[…\]) on the part of the Bundestag to effectively exercise its responsibility with regard to European integration (cf. BVerfGE 134, 366 <395 f. para. 48 f.>; 146, 216 <250 ff. para. 47 ff.>; 151, 202 <296 ff. para. 141 ff., 332 f. para. 218> – European Banking Union ; 157, 1 <22 f. para. 69 f.> – CETA – Organstreit I ; 158, 89 <122 ff. para. 91 ff., 130 para. 110> – PSPP – application for an order of execution ). \\n\\n124 \\n\\n 2. The principle of the sovereignty of the people in Art. 20(2) first sentence GG requires that any act of public authority exercised in Germany must be able to be traced back to the citizens, that is, the electorate (cf. BVerfGE 83, 37 <50 f.>; 93, 37 <66>; 130, 76 <123>; 137, 185 <232 para. 131>; 139, 194 <224 para. 106>; 142, 123 <191 para. 128>; 151, 202 <285 para. 117> – European Banking Union ; 154, 17 <85 para. 99> – PSPP asset purchase programme of the ECB ). With this principle, the Basic Law guarantees all citizens a right to free and equal participation in the process of conferring legitimation upon and influencing the public authority that governs them. This, in turn, prohibits measures that subject citizens to a political authority that they cannot escape and in regard of as to which they cannot in principle influence, on free and equal terms, decision-making on the persons in power or the decision-making on substantive issues (cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 <341>; 142, 123 <191 para. 128>; 151, 202 <285 f. para. 117> – European Banking Union ; 154, 17 <85 para. 99> – PSPP asset purchase programme of the ECB ). \\n\\n125 \\n\\n","statutory\_number":null,"whole\_instrument\_recall":"not\_established"} (rdf:JSON)
- `oa:hasSource`: [https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206\_2bvr054721en.html](https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206_2bvr054721en.html)
- `prov:wasDerivedFrom`: [evidence from https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206\_2bvr054721en.html](https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a136e3-96c5-74f2-b7ff-64da6b5d268f)
- `schema:isPartOf`: [Judgment of the Second Senate of 6 December 2022](https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a136e1-ff3c-74e7-a92f-e89ab4aa9f33)

## Elsewhere

- [Source](https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206_2bvr054721en.html) (www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de)

## Pointing here

- Errata in its text (5; `oa:hasTarget`):
  - [evidence from https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206\_2bvr054721en.html](https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a136e3-970a-7306-9a68-7b4e77935dd0)
  - [evidence from https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206\_2bvr054721en.html](https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a136e3-98a5-7209-80e1-8c6c8ef928f0)
  - [evidence from https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206\_2bvr054721en.html](https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a136e3-99db-7099-953b-9b945cc547e1)
  - [evidence from https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206\_2bvr054721en.html](https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a136e3-9ab3-706a-bc6c-faca732ea3c8)
  - [evidence from https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206\_2bvr054721en.html](https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a136e3-9b8d-77a4-9959-8123c3608514)

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Cite as: source excerpt from https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206\_2bvr054721en.html. bc-ontology, release 0.1.0-rc38, 2026-10-21. https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a136e3-96c5-74f2-b7ff-64db1533bc8a
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