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source excerpt from https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206_2bvr054721en.html. bc-ontology, release 0.1.0-rc38, 2026-10-21. https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a136e3-cd30-71ee-a26d-4be2acd1c984

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{"legal_state":"unknown","passage":{"end_byte":172714,"instrument_iri":"https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a136e1-ff3c-74e7-a92f-e89ab4aa9f33","original_sha256":"ee29139d7643a45f3481b73f67e72b88319aaaa0a3f0e70309c72499cb21e351","parsed_text_sha256":"5a5bc5dcb4029525539a6e857867318a14192d06e8b3f1f8b9efdd27ceedf033","source_url":"https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206_2bvr054721en.html","start_byte":161893},"policy":"retained-legal-source-passage-v1","quote":"2021 | EUR 154.049 billion | EUR 335.151 billion\n2022 | EUR 153.254 billion | EUR 312.582 billion\n2023 | EUR 152.848 billion | EUR 102.267 billion\n2024 | EUR 152.750 billion | -\n2025 | EUR 152.896 billion | -\n2026 | EUR 153.390 billion | -\n2027 | EUR 155.113 billion | -\n\n198 \n\n When viewing the allocation for the years 2021 and 2022 in isolation, the fact that the volume of funds borrowed under the NGEU by far exceeds the respective annual budget indicates a violation of Art. 311(2) and (3) TFEU. \n\n199 \n\n(2) However, a different legal assessment emerges when the multiannual financial framework of the European Union (cf. Art. 312 TFEU) is used as the relevant point of reference. \n\n200 \n\n The authorisation to borrow under the 2020 EU Own Resources Decision runs until 2026. In the years 2023 to 2026, the contemplated borrowing will be considerably lower than the volume of the general budget, such that for the majority of the years until 2026, the proper relationship between what should constitute the general rule and what should remain the exception under Art. 311(2) and (3) TFEU is maintained. This applies all the more if the analysis is based entirely on the multiannual financial framework, setting aside the principle of annuality. \n\n201 \n\n This was the approach, in particular, of the expert third parties heard at the oral hearing. One of these experts, Professor Feld, submitted that, based on information provided by the Federal Ministry of Finance, the volume of the multiannual financial framework amounts to EUR 1,094.4 billion in 2018 prices (including the Brexit Adjustment Reserve etc.). He stated that if the funds allocated under the NGEU were executed to the full amount, the total volume would be the equivalent of 68.5% of the current multiannual financial framework. Citing the likelihood of fluctuations over time, Professor Feld submitted that it could not be determined whether the annual borrowing would in fact exceed the annual budget of the EU. In 2021, due to Member States making use of the option of receiving a pre-financing payment in an amount of up to 13%, borrowing (in the amount of EUR 91 billion) was relatively high (approximately 54%) in relation to the volume of the general budget, which stood at 168 billion. According to the expert, the share of borrowing will likely decrease to 31% in 2022, with a volume of EUR 53 billion in borrowed funds as compared to a general budget of EU 170.8 billion. Professor Felbermayr, another expert, asserted that the multiannual financial framework has a volume of EUR 1,074 billion in 2018 prices, and that the NGEU financed through borrowing operations accounts for about 70%. He concluded that, for the relevant period 2021-2026, the average volume of borrowed funds does not exceed the general budget of the European Union. Considering the total volume of the multiannual financial framework and the NGEU, the expert found that roughly 41% of the European Union’s expenditure from 2021 to 2026 would be financed through debt. He claimed that, compared to the levels of new debt assumed by national governments in a normal economic climate, this constitutes a high rate of debt financing. He also pointed out that during the crisis years 2020 and 2021, the US had financed about 50% of federal expenditure through new debt, while the new net borrowing undertaken by Germany in those two years accounted for 30% and 39% of the annual expenditure, respectively. Based thereon, the expert concluded that the debt financing operations of the European Union are definitely at the upper end of the scale. According to his submission, the gross borrowing to be carried out by the European Union to implement the NGEU amounts to 5% of the GNI. Professor Fuest, another expert, asserted that borrowing (including the funds earmarked for loans provided to the Member States) accounted for 40% of the total budget including the NGEU and 67% of the EU budget excluding the NGEU. Regarding the principal authorisation of the European Commission to borrow EUR 356 billion (for the year 2021) and EUR 338 billion (for the year 2020) to finance the NGEU, he stated that the actual borrowing operations would depend on the progress made regarding the assessment of the recovery and resilience plans prepared by the Members States. It could therefore be assumed that the borrowing will take place over an extended period of time. \n\n202 \n\n Against this backdrop, and considering the design of the NGEU as well as the protective purpose underpinning Art. 311(2) and (3) TFEU, it does not appear manifestly untenable to base the legal analysis on the multiannual financial framework rather than the budget of a specific year. Based on this standard, the exception to the rule relationship mandated in the Treaty is only dispensed with for two out of the seven budget years in question; for the overall intended period of the NGEU, there is no deviation from the general rule. The long-term budget of the EU (2021-2027) amounts to EUR 1,074.3 billion (cf. Council Regulation <EU, Euratom> 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027, OJ EU L 433 I, p. 11 <21>). On this basis, while the NGEU funds of up to EUR 750 billion constitute a significant amount in comparison, it cannot be said that this manifestly gives rise to a violation of Art. 311(2) and (3) TFEU. \n\n203 \n\nc) Nor can it be established that the 2020 EU Own Resources Decision violates Art. 125(1) TEGU (see aa) below). While a circumvention of this provision cannot be ruled out (see bb) below), it is also not manifestly evident (see cc) below). \n\n204 \n\naa) According to Art. 125(1) first sentence TFEU, the European Union is not liable for and does not assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. The second sentence of that provision states the Member States also shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. \n\n205 \n\n As a result of the authorisation to obtain funds through borrowing under Art. 5 of the 2020 EU Own Resources Decision, the European Union assumes new debt on the capital markets, but it does not assume liability for commitments of the Member States. The increase in the own resources ceilings under Art. 6 of the 2020 EU Own Resources Decision, which applies until 2028 at the latest, means that the Member States themselves may incur new liabilities; however, even though their own financial obligations in terms of financing provided to the EU increase considerably, they do not assume liability for the debt of other Member States ([...]). Thus, a direct violation of Art. 125(1) TFEU can be ruled out from the outset, given that the NGEU neither establishes liability of the European Union for Member State commitments, nor does it create a mechanism that would impose direct liability on the Member States. \n\n206 \n\nbb) Nevertheless, the 2020 EU Own Resources Decision might lead to a circumvention of the no-bailout clause in Art. 125(1) TFEU (on the prohibition to circumvent the prohibition of monetary financing in Art. 123 TFEU, cf. BVerfGE 134, 366 <411 para. 86>; CJEU, Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler , C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, para. 101). \n\n207 \n\n The purpose of the no-bailout clause is to ensure that the financial policy of the Member States remains autonomous and that there is no mutual responsibility for the respective liabilities of the Member States. EU law does not allow a financial equalisation among Member States. Rather, the Treaties ensure that the Member States remain subject to the logic of the market when they enter into debt (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 27 November 2012, Pringle , C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756, para. 116). Thus, recourse to Art. 122 TFEU would be impermissible if it serves to circumvent the no-bailout clause in Art. 125 TFEU regarding the liability for commitments of another Member States ([...]). \n\n208 \n\n Such a circumvention of Art. 125 TFEU cannot be ruled out completely in the present case. A number of Member States have excessive debt (cf. Eurostat, Key figures on Europe, 83/2022, 21 July 2022). In light of this, the NGEU could serve to alleviate the pressure of market logic on these Member States and provide them with favourable lending conditions, as was explained by Professor Felbemayr in his expert submission ([...]). With debt financed non-repayable grants and the borrowing by the European Union in the context of the NGEU, the need for Member States to engage in new borrowing at the national level is considerably reduced or might even be eliminated. \n\n209 \n\n If the authorised appropriations entered in the Union budget are not sufficient to cover liabilities arising from the borrowing linked to the NGEU, the European Commission is empowered, as its last resort, to call on the Member States to make the necessary resources available in proportion (‘pro rata’) to their respective contribution to the EU budget. The same rule applies if a Member State fails, in full or in part, to honour a call on time; in that event, the European Commission provisionally has the right to make additional calls on the other Member States to cover for the part of the Member State concerned (Art. 9(5) subpara. 2 first sentence of the 2020 EU Own Resources Decision). Yet the Member State which failed to honour a call remains liable to cover its part of the call for additional financing to meet the obligations resulting from the borrowing. The other Member States do not assume true liability for that Member State’s part; the European Commission may only call on them to provide interim financing (Art. 9(5) subpara. 2 first sentence 2020 EU Own Resources Decision), which therefore only constitutes a provisional commitment, not a permanent one. \n\n210 \n\n cc) It is true that the borrowing on the part of the European Union and the rules on repayment appear somewhat at odds with the no-bailout clause enshrined in Art. 125(1) TFEU. However, Art. 125(1) TFEU ultimately does not rule out the allocation of NGEU funds on the basis of the competence conferred in Art. 122 TFEU under EU primary law. The value judgments underpinning Art. 122 TFEU do not fall short of the ones enshrined in Art. 125(1) TFEU, which is why it cannot be concluded that the 2020 EU Own Resources Decision manifestly enables a circumvention of the latter provision. \n\n211 \n\n","statutory_number":null,"whole_instrument_recall":"not_established"}rdf:JSON
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