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| oa:bodyValue | {"legal_state":"unknown","passage":{"end_byte":195210,"instrument_iri":"https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a136e1-ff3c-74e7-a92f-e89ab4aa9f33","original_sha256":"ee29139d7643a45f3481b73f67e72b88319aaaa0a3f0e70309c72499cb21e351","parsed_text_sha256":"5a5bc5dcb4029525539a6e857867318a14192d06e8b3f1f8b9efdd27ceedf033","source_url":"https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206_2bvr054721en.html","start_byte":183856},"policy":"retained-legal-source-passage-v1","quote":"(aa) In view of the budgetary principle of annuality (cf. inter alia Art. 110(2) GG, § 11(1) Federal Budget Code, Bundeshaushaltsordnung – BHO; Art. 310(1) subpara. 2, Art. 312(1) subpara. 3, Art. 312(3) subpara. 2, Art. 313, Art. 314(1) TFEU; Arts. 9 to 16 of the Financial Regulation; […]), constitutional review of this issue must look at the potential maximum burden per year rather than the total sum of (potential) liabilities that could be incurred until the year 2058. While it is true that by approving the Act Ratifying the EU Own Resources Decision in 2021, the Bundestag , in its 19th legislative term, has taken a decision that will bind future Parliaments and restrict parliamentary latitude in budgetary matters considerably and over many years, making this type of commitment are an inherent part of parliamentary law-making. The fact that the principle of democracy generally presupposes the reversibility of parliamentary decisions (cf. BVerfGE 141, 1 <21 f. para. 53>) does not rule out commitments that are legally and factually binding and that cannot easily be reversed. \n\n225 \n\n According to the Federal Government’s prognosis, which aligns with the legislator’s assessment, the maximum amount that the European Commission could request in additional financing, besides contributions for principal payments on the funds borrowed in the context of the NGEU, would be approximately EUR 21.8 billion annually. In the highly unrealistic scenario that all other Member States except Germany fail to honour calls to provide additional financing, this is the maximum burden that would have to borne by the federal budget annually until 2058 (cf. BVerfGE 157, 332 <392 f. para. 109> – Act Ratifying the EU Own Resources Decision – preliminary injunction ). The complainants in proceedings no. I assume that the maximum annual burden additionally imposed on the federal budget would range from EUR 24.84 billion to 32.25 billion, based on an assumed maximum risk of liabilities in the amount of about EUR 770 billion until 2058, whereas the complainant in proceedings no. II has calculated the maximum annual amount at EUR 20.81 billion. According to the Bundestag ’s prognosis, the maximum amount that might additionally have to be borne by the federal budget would be EUR 21.75 billion annually. The oral hearing has furnished evidence essentially supporting this prognosis. Professor Feld has submitted – based on information provided by the Federal Ministry of Finance – that in the event of all Member States except Germany failing to honour calls for additional financing, the extra burden on the federal budget would be EUR 21.8 billion annually, amounting to roughly EUR 675.8 billion in total until 2058 (both calculations assume constant prices). Professor Felbermayr assessed the maximum amount resulting from the obligation to provide additional financing at EUR 25.4 billion annually and Professor Fuest calculated the amount at EUR 28 billion. All of the expert third parties have emphasised that the scenario of all Member States except Germany defaulting is highly unrealistic and mostly theoretical in nature. \n\n226 \n\n But even in that scenario, the maximum annual burden additionally borne by the federal budget would be between EUR 21 and 28 billion. On that basis, it cannot be concluded that the budgetary power of the Bundestag would be restricted or effectively vitiated for a considerable period of time. In the (pre-pandemic) fiscal year 2019, the revenue and expenditure in the federal budget was roughly EUR 357.1 billion (cf. Federal Ministry of Finance, Haushaltsrechnung des Bundes für das Haushaltsjahr 2019, vol. 1, p. 3). In the fiscal year 2020, the federal budget stood at around EUR 443.4 billion (cf. Federal Ministry of Finance, Haushaltsrechnung des Bundes für das Haushaltsjahr 2020, vol. 1, p. 3), compared to EUR 557.1 billion in the fiscal year 2021 (cf. Federal Ministry of Finance, Haushaltsrechnung des Bundes für das Haushaltsjahr 2021, vol. 1, p. 3). For the year 2022, a federal budget of roughly EUR 495.8 billion has been approved (cf. 2022 Budget Law, BGBl I p. 890). The fiscal projections for the 2023 federal budget are assessed at EUR 445.2, and for the 2024, 2025 and 2026 federal budgets are assessed at EUR 423.7 billion, EUR 428.6 billion, and EUR 436.3 billion, respectively (cf. Federal Ministry of Finance, Press Release No. 17 of 1 July 2022). These figures do not yet include ancillary budgets and special funds. \n\n227 \n\n The overall public debt (Federation, Länder , municipalities and municipal associations, public social insurance providers, including all ancillary budgets) together with debt in the non-public sector (financial institutions as well as the domestic and international activities of private businesses) amounted to EUR 2,318.9 billion in the first quarter of 2022, of which federal debt accounted for EUR 1,546.9 billion (cf. Federal Statistical Office, Press Release No. 271 of 29 June 2022). \n\n228 \n\n These comparative figures demonstrate that the mathematically possible maximum burden on the federal budget would be considerable, and significant with regard to political leeway, but that it would not have the effect of vitiating the budgetary powers of Parliament. Without prejudice to the requirements following from Art. 109(3) and Art. 115(2) GG, this also applies with regard to the remaining degree of flexibility in budgetary policies. \n\n229 \n\n(bb) Moreover, based on a valid prognosis, the legislator assumes this scenario to be highly unlikely. The less likely the scenario in question is, the more tenable for Parliament to take a calculated risk. At the same time, even a low likelihood of the relevant risk materialising would result in consequently more weight as the potential liability assumed by Germany, and thus also the potential risk to the Bundestag ’s budgetary powers, increases. In present case, the volume of the maximum liabilities assumed is considerable, however, the risk the Germany will indeed be the only Member State held liable for the total volume of the NGEU almost non-existent. It was within the Bundestag ’s margin of appreciation to adopt the challenged Act and to thereby give its approval to the 2020 EU Own Resources Decision and to assume the underlying risks of liability. \n\n230 \n\n In an overall consideration of other payment obligations and assumptions of liability on the part of Germany in the context of the Economic and Monetary Union, there does not appear to be a violation of the budgetary powers of the Bundestag . It is first and foremost for Parliament to decide, in balancing affected current interests with the risks of mid-term and long-term guarantees, to what extent payment obligations and guarantees can tenably be assumed (cf. BVerfGE 135, 317 <401 para. 164>). Even where an individual payment obligation or guarantee is not objectionable under constitutional law, a (gradual) accumulation of such commitments may reach a point where the budgetary powers are in fact restricted to such degree that the Bundestag is no longer “master of its own decisions” (cf. BVerfGE 129, 124 <179 f.>; 132, 195 <240>; 135, 317 <401 para. 163 f.>; 153, 74 <154 para. 140> – Unified Patent Court ). \n\n231 \n\n However, it was not evident from the oral hearing that, in an overall assessment of other existing payment obligations and assumptions of liability, the Bundestag had relinquished its budgetary powers by adopting the Act Ratifying the Own Resources Decision such that it was no longer “master of its own decisions”. Given the existing payment obligations and assumptions of liability, the future financial leeway of the Bundestag has of course significantly shrunk. In the statement made by the representative of the Federal Court of Audit, it is submitted that the federal budget is effectively “paralysed” due to the considerable amount of existing commitments, with only 10% of disposable funds, of which about 1% would have to be dedicated for principal and interest payments in the context of NGEU. Ultimately, it was found that the liability risks stemming from contingent liabilities such as EFSF, ESM, Temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) and NGEU could not be verified with certainty, given that it would not be possible to conduct a reliable appraisal of the overall risk resulting from EU-related commitments. \n\n232 \n\n […] \n\n233 \n\nc) In light of these commitments, the Bundestag has an ongoing duty, in the context of its responsibility with regard to European integration, to monitor the use of funds from NGEU and the development of risks of liability arising from the programme and, when necessary, to take suitable action to protect the federal budget. In light of the NGEU having, at best, a weak democratic foundation in terms of parliamentary legitimation, the Bundestag – in cooperation with the Federal Government and in the exercise of its parliamentary rights set out in Art. 23(2) and (3) GG as well as in the Act on Cooperation Between the Federal Government and the German Bundestag in Matters Concerning the European Union – has a duty to assess how NGEU funds will be used and how the associated liability risks for the federal budget develop. If new information emerges that calls into question the credibility of the initial risk prognosis, the Bundestag must immediately take suitable measures to ensure protection of the federal budget. \n\n234 \n\n The requirements developed in the Second Senate’s case-law on the financial aid measures for Greece, the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism (cf. BVerfGE 132, 195 <241 para. 110>; 135, 317 <402 para. 165>; cf. also BVerfGE 129, 124 <180 f.>; 157, 332 <381 f. para. 85> – Act Ratifying the EU Own Resources Decision – preliminary injunction ) are not directly applicable to the present proceedings, which concern the system of own resources of the European Union established in accordance with Art. 311(3) TFEU. In this context, the overall budgetary responsibility of the Bundestag is limited to approving the provision of own resources with the domestic ratifying act pursuant to the third sentence of that treaty provision and to exercising oversight vis-à-vis the Federal Government regarding the governmental negotiations and voting behaviour in the Council on matters concerning the EU budget. However, the situation is different when the appropriation of funds concerns other revenue in the context of Art. 311(2) TFEU, i.e. funds that do not provide financing to the general EU budget, but are assigned to specific purposes. In this regard, the appropriation of funds lacks the legitimation that would normally be conferred by the involvement of the European Parliament in the budget procedure pursuant to Art. 314 TFEU. This lack of legitimation at EU level corresponds to a greater scope of the Bundestag ’s responsibility with regard to European integration at the domestic level. \n\n235 \n\n3. Ultimately, the 2020 EU Own Resources Decision does not violate the right to democratic self-determination of the complainants in proceedings no. I and II following from Art. 38(1) first sentence in conjunction with Art. 20(1) and (2) as well as Art. 79(3) GG. \n\nIII.\n\n\n236 \n\n","statutory_number":null,"whole_instrument_recall":"not_established"}rdf:JSON |
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Errata in its text (3)oa:hasTarget
- evidence from https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206_2bvr054721en.html
- evidence from https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206_2bvr054721en.html
- evidence from https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2022/12/rs20221206_2bvr054721en.html