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source excerpt from https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/health-genetic-and-other-body-information/biometrics/gd_bio_org-final

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source excerpt from https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/health-genetic-and-other-body-information/biometrics/gd_bio_org-final. bc-ontology, release 0.1.0-rc38, 2026-10-21. https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a136ee-1df6-773c-8ff3-922b85c06007

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{"legal_state":"unknown","passage":{"end_byte":35295,"instrument_iri":"https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a136e6-e4c7-751a-aab1-cf7b43804895","original_sha256":"7e8268783f569038b1ba34c831d65ca72d098abdba7c87583caa5a76b365c0da","parsed_text_sha256":"2fe44ee62be28ad6152eba70aff17d7fb32b9e562ea1808b6ad947989a41551f","source_url":"https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/health-genetic-and-other-body-information/biometrics/gd_bio_org-final","start_byte":23309},"policy":"retained-legal-source-passage-v1","quote":"Renew consent when extending scope: Any extension of the use of biometric information must not be undertaken without first obtaining the individual’s consent for that new use, unless a valid legal exception to consent applies. In this sense, organizations should not view consent as a one-time requirement, never to be revisited. On the contrary, ensuring the validity of consent is an ongoing process and consent may require renewal as circumstances change and as organizations innovate, grow, and evolve.\n\nLimiting collection\n\nUnder PIPEDA Principle 4.4, you must limit the collection of personal information to that which is necessary for achieving your stated purpose.\n\nYou Must:\n\n\nUse the minimum number of biometric characteristics needed: This includes both the amount of a single characteristic, and the combination of characteristics. For example, if you can meet your purpose by using points from a single fingerprint — keeping in mind Principle 6 of PIPEDA (Accuracy), addressed below — then you must not collect prints from the entire hand, or use prints in conjunction with other biological or behavioural biometrics.\n\nPIPEDA Report of Findings #2010-007\n\nIn an investigation regarding the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT), the OPC concluded that there were less privacy-invasive means to meet the Association of American Medical Colleges’ (AAMC) purpose of preventing exam fraud. The AAMC agreed to limit the personal information that it collected, and to only collect and retain fingerprint information in a digital format, which was to be converted into unique digital templates composed of a string of alpha/numeric characters and held securely. The OPC was satisfied that this outcome effectively addressed concerns with respect to both privacy and AAMC’s need to protect the integrity of the high-stakes MCAT exam.\n\nYou Should:\n\n\nUse verification over identification, where possible: Verification is based on a one-to-one match with an individual’s biometric information, which can limit what is needed for identification to achieve accurate results. Before using an identification system, you should consider whether your purpose can be met by using a verification system instead.\n\nSeek to keep the template in the individual’s control: There are different biometric template formats that vary in how much control they provide to the individual. You should strive to keep biometric templates in the individual’s control so long as that is the most secure option that allows you to achieve your identified purpose. For example, you could store it on a device or a portable token in their possession, such as a mobile phone. You should avoid creating large, centralized databases of biometric information if alternatives are viable. In the event of a breach, centralized databases are vulnerable to a wider scope and magnitude of potential privacy impacts.\n\nLimit its technical capability: As a design choice, you should consider biometric systems that do not contain additional features that enable broader collection of personal information than that required to fulfill your specific purposes.\n\nLimiting use, disclosure, and retention\n\nUnder PIPEDA Principle 4.5, biometric information must only be used for the purposes for which the information was collected, with few exceptions. This applies both to biometric information in a database and to biometric samples collected from an individual. PIPEDA also identifies limited circumstances in which personal information can be disclosed without consent.Footnote 4\n\nYou Must:\n\n\nNot extract secondary information without consent: Some biometric information can reveal secondary information, such as that related to health, ethnicity, or biological relationships. You must have consent to extract or analyze any secondary biometric information, unless an exception to consent applies under PIPEDA. Even if you obtain consent for the use, you must still ensure that the purpose of your use is appropriate.\n\nLimit retention: Biometric information must only be kept for a period that is necessary to fulfill your stated purpose and any legal obligations, after which it must be permanently destroyed from all locations, including devices, cloud storage, and back-ups. This applies as well to biometric information that is collected, used, or retained by a third party operating on your behalf. In order to fulfill the stated purpose, it may sometimes be necessary to use or retain biometric information for a limited period of time to allow for system testing, human review, or verification of system updates.\n\nIn previous investigations involving biometric systems, the OPC found that the appropriate data retention period depends on the context. For fingerprint digital templates collected from test takers, for example, a period of five years was appropriate since this matched the validity of the test results.Footnote 5 For voiceprints collected from employees, retaining the biometric data for one month after the employee left the organization was found to be appropriate.Footnote 6\n\nIn our joint investigation of Cadillac Fairview, we found that MappedIn, a third party service provider acting on CFCL’s behalf, inappropriately retained numerical representations of individuals’ faces beyond the very brief period necessary to process their facial images with video analytics software. OPC noted that MappedIn and CFCL did not identify any reason for retaining this information.\n\nYou Should:\n\n\nKeep a tight circle: You should use a biometric system that does not disclose information to third parties, unless there is a specific operational reason for doing so that is authorized by law. In systems where the sharing of biometric information with others is required, the parties with whom it is shared and the information that is shared must be limited to what is necessary to fulfill the identified purpose. Refer to the Accountability section in this guidance to learn more about your responsibilities in ensuring that third parties do not misuse information that you share with them.\n\nDe-link across systems: You should ensure that the biometric system provider does not link data across different implementations of the system. You should also ensure that databases of biometric information used for one purpose are not linked with personal information that is not needed for that purpose.\n\nDistinguish retention of biometric information from that of other personal information: Biometric information serves a specific purpose and its retention should be distinguished from that of other personal information. Where biometric information is linked with associated personal information (for example, a name, date of birth, or biometric sample), separate retention schedules should be used if the other personal information is needed for a different period of time than the biometric information.\n\nDelete biometric information upon request: If an individual withdraws consent for your use of biometric information, you should delete all the biometric information you have collected about them. This includes any personal information you have created using analysis of that biometric information, subject to legal or contractual restrictions and reasonable notice to the individual. You should also ensure that the same is done, to the extent possible, by any third parties with whom you have shared the information.\n\nSafeguards\n\nSafeguarding refers to the implementation of measures to protect personal information against loss, theft, or any unauthorized access, use, disclosure, copying, or modification. Under PIPEDA Principle 4.7, organizations are responsible for protecting personal information with security safeguards appropriate to the sensitivity of the information.\n\nBiometric information, like other types of personal information, is not immune to breaches.\n\nBiometric technology itself might also be used to safeguard other personal information. When used this way, biometrics are vulnerable to spoofing attacks, where false information is presented to fool a biometric system into providing a positive match. Deep learning and neural network technology can be used to create convincing fabrications of an individual’s biometric information to thwart identification technology. The rising use of deepfakes, voice synthesis, and other impersonation techniques using biometric information could also be used to compromise individuals’ accounts or identity.\n\nYou Must:\n\n\nUse physical, organizational, and technical measures to safeguard against the different ways a breach could occur.\n\nSpecific security vulnerabilities can vary depending on the biometric technology being used and the way information is collected, used, and disclosed. For example, fingerprints can leave latent marks that can be lifted by malicious actors, and some forms of biometric technology may be easier to spoof than others.\n\nReview and update security measures regularly to ensure that these measures address evolving security threats and vulnerabilities, including risks specific to your choice of biometric technology.\n\nPIPEDA Report of Findings #2022-003\n\nWe noted in our Rogers’ Voice ID report of findings that voiceprints were well safeguarded. Voiceprints were stored in an encrypted and proprietary format on Canadian servers under Rogers’ control. Rogers confirmed that no third parties had access to the voiceprints for any purpose. Rogers further advised that access to the database was restricted to its Voice ID administration team, and that the voiceprints could not be used outside of their system. Our review of software documentation confirmed that FreeSpeech, a third-party software used in the Voice ID solution, was deployed by its customers and is not centrally managed, accessible to, or controlled by the third-party provider. Additionally, our review confirmed that voiceprints were signed using an encryption key unique to the specific instance of FreeSpeech, to protect against their use in other programs or in other FreeSpeech implementations.\n\nReport breaches: When sensitive biometric information is subject to a privacy breach, there is a high likelihood that the breach will create a real risk of significant harm to affected individuals. Any breach of security safeguards involving biometric personal information must be reported to the OPC and to affected individuals if it is reasonable in the circumstances to believe that the breach creates a real risk of significant harm to an individual (section 10.1 of PIPEDA).\n\nYou Should:\n\n\nUse biometric systems that are privacy protective by design: Whether you are developing a biometric system in-house or using technology supplied by a third-party service provider, you should ensure that the system you use has privacy protections built in by design. If you are using a third-party service provider, make sure you understand the security risks involved in your use of biometrics as well as the mitigation strategies put in place by prospective technology suppliers.\n\nConsider the following design features when developing or choosing a biometric system:\n\n- Cancellable biometrics: These are biometric templates that distort data to prevent it from being converted back into the original biometric information. This allows multiple templates to be associated with the same biometric data, so that templates can be revoked (like a password) if they are compromised. The template can also be unlinkable, so that different biometric templates belonging to a single individual cannot be linked together. You should also consider making the format of biometric templates unique to your biometric system, such that it cannot be used by others.\n- Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs): For some uses of biometrics, methods such as homomorphic encryption can be used to conduct biometric matching without needing to decrypt the biometric template. For more information about homomorphic encryption, read our report.\n","statutory_number":null,"whole_instrument_recall":"not_established"}rdf:JSON
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