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source excerpt from https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-277_d18f.pdf

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source excerpt from https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-277_d18f.pdf. bc-ontology, release 0.1.0-rc38, 2026-10-21. https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a138c1-ff3e-70ff-8b52-39cd22e2ba53

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{"legal_state":"unknown","passage":{"end_byte":83848,"instrument_iri":"https://ontology.bommaritollc.com/id/01a138b9-6093-7780-b392-e793256ae2d5","original_sha256":"4f3512f7eef604b811b34c43cf9a88febd9b1896b207b0c0bcb819fa06262e72","parsed_text_sha256":"d790e199352786aad9d8a0559cd5f86d04605c20c3b874926dec1f6b355ddd9b","source_url":"https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-277_d18f.pdf","start_byte":71864},"policy":"retained-legal-source-passage-v1","quote":"ate a better speech balance. The current amalgam, the\n\nState explained in earlier briefing, was “skewed” to one\n\nside. 573 F. Supp. 3d, at 1116. And that assessment mir\u0002\n\nrored the stated views of those who enacted the law, save\n\nthat the latter had a bit more color. The law’s main sponsor\n\nexplained that the “West Coast oligarchs” who ran social\u0002\n\nmedia companies were “silenc[i \r\nng] conservative viewpoints\n\nand ideas.” \r\nIbid. \r\n The Governor, in signing the legislation,\n\n\nechoed the point: The companies were fomenting a “danger\u0002\n\nous movement” to “silence” conservatives. Id., at 1108;\n\nsee id., at 1099 (“[S]ilencing conservative views is un\u0002\n\nAmerican, it’s un-Texan and it’s about to be illegal in\n\nTexas”).\n\nBut a State may not interfere with private actors’ speech\n\nto advance its own vision of ideological balance. States (and\n\ntheir citizens) are of course right to want an expressive\n\nrealm in which the public has access to a wide range of\n\nviews. That is, indeed, a fundamental aim of the First\n\nAmendment. But the way the First Amendment achieves\n\nthat goal is by preventing the government from “tilt[ing]\n\npublic debate in a preferred direction.” Sorrell l v. IMS\n\nHealth Inc., 564 U. S. 552, 578–579 (2011). It is not by li\u0002\n\ncensing the government to stop p private actors from speak\u0002\n\ning as they wish and preferring some views over others.\n\nAnd that is so even when those actors possess “enviable ve\u0002\n\nhicle[s]” for expression. Hurley, 515 U. S., at 577. In a bet\u0002\n\nter world, there would be fewer inequities in speech oppor\u0002\n\ntunities; and the government can take many steps to bring\n\nthat world closer. But it cannot prohibit speech to improve\n\nor better balance the speech market. On the spectrum of\n\n28 MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC\n\n\nOpinion of the Court\n\ndangers to free expression, there are few greater than al\u0002\n\nlowing the government to change the speech of private ac\u0002\n\ntors in order to achieve its own conception of speech nir\u0002\n\nvana. That is why we have said in so many contexts that\n\nthe government may not “restrict the speech of some ele\u0002\n\nments of our society in order to enhance the relative voice\n\nof others.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (p(per\n\ncuriam). That unadorned interest is not “unrelated to the\n\nsuppression of free expression,” and the government may\n\nnot pursue it consistent with the First Amendment.\n\nThe Court’s decisions about editorial control, as discussed\n\nearlier, make that point repeatedly. See supra \r\n, at 18–19.\n\nAgain, the question those cases had in common was\n\nwhether the government could force a private speaker, in\u0002\n\ncluding a compiler and curator of third-party speech, to con\u0002\n\nvey views it disapproved. And in most of those cases, the\n\ngovernment defended its regulation as yielding greater bal\u0002\n\nance in the marketplace of ideas. But the Court—in\n\nTornillo, in P PG&E, and again in Hurley—held that such an\n\ninterest could not support the government’s effort to alter\n\nthe speaker’s own expression. “Our cases establish,” the\n\nPG&E Court wrote, “that the State cannot advance some\n\npoints of view by burdening the expression of others.” 475\n\nU. S., at 20. So the newspaper, the public utility, the pa\u0002\n\nrade organizer—whether acting “fair[ly] or unfair[ly]”—\n\ncould exclude the unwanted message, free from government\n\ninterference. Tornillo, 418 U. S., at 258; see United States\n\nTelecom Assn. v v. F FCC, 855 F. 3d 381, 432 (CADC 2017) (Ka\u0002\n\nvanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)\n\n(“[E]xcept in rare circumstances, the First Amendment\n\ndoes not allow the Government to regulate the content\n\nchoices of private editors just so that the Government may\n\nenhance certain voices and alter t the content available to the\n\ncitizenry”).10\n\n——————\n\n10Texas claims Turner as a counter-example, but that decision offers\n\nCite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 29\n\nOpinion of the Court\n\nThe case here is no different. The interest Texas asserts\n\nis in changing the balance of speech on the major platforms’\n\nfeeds, so that messages now excluded will be included. To\n\ndescribe that interest, the State borrows language from this\n\nCourt’s First Amendment cases, maintaining that it is pre\u0002\n\nventing “viewpoint discrimination.” Brief for Texas 19; see\n\nsupra, at 26–27. But the Court uses that language to say\n\nwhat governments cannot do: They cannot prohibit private\n\nactors from expressing certain views. When Texas uses\n\nthat language, it is to say what private actors cannot do:\n\nThey cannot decide for themselves what views to convey.\n\nThe innocent-sounding phrase does not redeem the prohib\u0002\n\nited goal. The reason Texas is regulating the content\u0002\n\nmoderation policies that the major platforms use for their\n\nfeeds is to change the speech that will be displayed there.\n\nTexas does not like the way those platforms are selecting\n\nand moderating content, and wants them to create a differ\u0002\n\nent expressive product, communicating different values\n\nand priorities. But under the First Amendment, that is a\n\npreference Texas may not impose.\n\n——————\n\nno help to speak of. Turner did indeed hold that the FCC’s must-carry\n\nprovisions, requiring cable operators to give some of their channel space\n\nto local broadcast stations, passed First Amendment muster. See supra,\n\nat 15. But the interest there advanced was not to balance expressive\n\ncontent; rather, the interest was to save the local-broadcast industry, so\n\nthat it could continue to serve households without cable. That interest,\n\nthe Court explained, was “unrelated to the content of expression” dissem\u0002\n\ninated by either cable or broadcast speakers. Turner I, I, 512 U. S. 622,\n\n647 (1994). And later, the Hurley Court again noted the difference. It\n\nunderstood the Government interest in Turner as one relating to compe\u0002\n\ntition policy: The FCC needed to limit the cable operators’ “monopolistic,”\n\ngatekeeping position “in order to allow for the survival of broadcasters.”\n\n515 U. S., at 577. Unlike in regulating the parade—or here in regulating\n\nFacebook’s News Feed or YouTube’s homepage—the Government’s inter\u0002\n\nest was “not the alteration of speech.” Ibid. And when that is so, the\n\nprospects of permissible regulation are entirely different.\n\n30 MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC\n\n\nOpinion of the Court\n\nIV\n\nThese are facial challenges, and that matters. To succeed\n\non its First Amendment claim, NetChoice must show that\n\nthe law at issue (whether from Texas or from Florida) “pro\u0002\n\nhibits a substantial amount of protected speech relative to\n\nits plainly legitimate sweep.” Hansen, 599 U. S., at 770.\n\nNone of the parties below focused on that issue; nor did the\n\nFifth or Eleventh Circuits. But that choice, unanimous as\n\nit has been, cannot now control. Even in the First Amend\u0002\n\nment context, facial challenges are disfavored, and neither\n\nparties nor courts can disregard the requisite inquiry into\n\nhow a law works in all of its applications. So on remand,\n\neach court must evaluate the full scope of the law’s cover\u0002\n\nage. It must then decide which of the law’s applications are\n\nconstitutionally permissible and which are not, and finally\n\nweigh the one against the other. The need for NetChoice to\n\ncarry its burden on those issues is the price of its decision\n\nto challenge the laws as a whole.\n\nBut there has been enough litigation already to know\n\nthat the Fifth Circuit, if it stayed the course, would get\n\nwrong at least one significant input into the facial analysis.\n\nThe parties treated Facebook’s News Feed and YouTube’s\n\nhomepage as the heartland applications of the Texas law.\n\nAt least on the current record, the editorial judgments in\u0002\n\nfluencing the content of those feeds are, contrary to the\n\nFifth Circuit’s view, protected expressive activity. And\n\nTexas may not interfere with those judgments simply be\u0002\n\ncause it would prefer a different mix of messages. How that\n\nmatters for the requisite facial analysis is for the Fifth Cir\u0002\n\ncuit to decide. But it should conduct that analysis in keep\u0002\n\ning with two First Amendment precepts. First, presenting\n\na curated and “edited compilation of [third party] speech” is\n\nitself protected speech. Hurley, 515 U. S., at 570. And sec\u0002\n\nond, a State “cannot advance some points of view by bur\u0002\n\ndening the expression of others.” PG&E, \r\n475 U. S., at 20.\n\nTo give government that power is to enable it to control the\n\nCite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 31\n\nOpinion of the Court\n\nexpression of ideas, promoting those it favors and suppress\u0002\n\ning those it does not. And that is what the First Amend\u0002\n\nment protects all of us from.\n\nWe accordingly vacate the judgments of the Courts of Ap\u0002\n\npeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and remand the\n\ncases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n\nIt is so ordered.\n\nCite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 1\n\nBARRETT, J., concurring\n\nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES\n\n\n_________________\n\nNos. 22–277 and 22–555\n\n_________________\n\nASHLEY MOODY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA, ET AL., PETITIONERS\n\n\n22–277 v.\n\nNETCHOICE, LLC, DBA A NETCHOICE, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT\n\n\nNETCHOICE, LLC, DBA NETCHOICE, ET AL., PETITIONERS\n\n\n22–555 v.\n\nKEN PAXTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n[July 1, 2024]\n\nJUSTICE BARRETT, concurring.\n\nI join the Court’s opinion, which correctly articulates and\n\napplies our First Amendment precedent. In this respect,\n\nthe Eleventh Circuit’s understanding of the First Amend\u0002\n\nment’s protection of editorial discretion was generally cor\u0002\n\nrect; the Fifth Circuit’s was not.\n\nBut for the reasons the Court gives, these cases illustrate\n\nthe dangers of bringing a facial challenge. If NetChoice’s\n\nmembers are concerned about preserving their editorial dis\u0002\n\ncretion with respect to the services on which they have fo\u0002\n\ncused throughout this litigation—e.g., Facebook’s Newsfeed\n\nand YouTube’s homepage—they would be better served by\n\nbringing a First Amendment challenge as applied to those\n\nfunctions. Analyzing how the First Amendment bears on\n\n2 MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC\n\n\nBARRETT, J., concurring\n\nthose functions is complicated enough without simultane\u0002\n\nously analyzing how it bears on a platform’s other func\u0002\n\ntions—e.g., Facebook Messenger and Google Search—much\n\nless to distinct platforms like Uber and Etsy. In fact, deal\u0002\n\ning with a broad swath of varied platforms and functions in\n\na facial challenge strikes me as a daunting, if not impossi\u0002\n\nble, task. A function qualifies for First Amendment protec\u0002\n\ntion only if it is inherently expressive. Hurley v. Irish\u0002\n\nAmerican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,\n\n515 U. S. 557, 568 (1995). Even for a prototypical social\u0002\n\nmedia feed, making this determination involves more than\n\nmeets the eye.\n\nConsider, for instance, how platforms use algorithms to\n\nprioritize and remove content on their feeds. Assume that\n\nhuman beings decide to remove posts promoting a particu\u0002\n\nlar political candidate or advocating some position on a\n\npublic-health issue. If they create an algorithm to help\n\nthem identify and delete that content, the First Amend\u0002\n\nment protects their exercise of editorial judgment—even if\n\nthe algorithm does most of the deleting without a person in\n\nthe loop. In that event, the algorithm would simply imple\u0002\n\nment human beings’ inherently expressive choice “to ex\u0002\n\nclude a message [they] did not like from” their speech com\u0002\n\npilation. Id., at 574.\n\nBut what if a platform’s algorithm just presents automat\u0002\n\nically to each user whatever the algorithm thinks the user\n\nwill like—e.g., content similar to posts with which the user\n\npreviously engaged? See ante, at 22, n. 5. The First\n\nAmendment implications of the Florida and Texas laws\n\n","statutory_number":null,"whole_instrument_recall":"not_established"}rdf:JSON
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